1S cepticisma nd Acknowledgement
Following the scholarlydefinition of scepticism, Cavell'sintricate argumentation for the primacy of the counter-principle-"acknowledgement"-can be concentratedo nt wo focal points: on the problem of ar elationship to the world as a whole, and on the problem of other minds. Concerningthe latter,Cavell counters the sceptics (and their equallyc ognitivistico pponents) with the idea thatw hat separates us as human beingsorassubjects is not,ornot primarily, our bodies, but our minds, or more precisely "aparticular aspect or stance of the mind".Cavell names this aspect "position" or "attitude".Thus what separates us from each other as entities in space and time and as empirical subjectivities is an attitude, an ethos in the Greek sense of the word. Separateness,then, is something which can be denied or acknowledged (seeSparti/Hammer 2002 :21, Cavell 1979a .
Cavell'sc oncept of acknowledgement at first is distinct from the one which made Hegelfamous in aGerman and continental European context.For Cavell's, acknowledgement simplym eans that (expressive) statements by another party, or by another person, prompt ar eaction, regardless of which one. This reaction can be positive,indifferent or negative.Itisthe reaction as such which is important,for it conveys anon-epistemic confirmation of the other person. ForCavell, the attitude of acknowledgement represents "ac ompletelye lementary form" of intersubjective confirmation located "below the threshold",m arking the "affirmationo fs pecific characteristics of the opposite person in question".T hus, the attitude of acknowledgement is an affirmation of the non-specific characteristics of ap erson. This fundamental level is concerned-as we could say-with "existential",o ra sIprefer to say: ontological affirmation (Honneth2 005:6 0).
Cavell'sa rgumentation in favour of the primacy of acknowledgement also concentrates on as econd context.Cavell sees the "truth" or the "moral of scepticism" in the idea "that the human creature'sbasis in the world as awhole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing".T he term "world as a whole" (Welttotalität)suggests aKantian understanding,and in fact,Cavell readilyr efers to "Kant'si nsight" that there are "limitations of knowledge",b ut that these are not,o rd on ot have to be "failures" (Cavell 1979a: 241, see 48) . They are onlyfailures from the point of view of asubjectwhich misunderstands itself cognitivistically, which would like to assume its place opposite to the world as a whole, and which in so doing becomes placeless and homeless in it.For the concept of the world, which is, as Kant clarifies, actually an "inclusive concept" (Inbegriff)o ra n" idea" (Cavell 1979a : 393, Kant KrV: 406 -409,G abriel 2008 , this means that in every single act of knowledge we are necessitatedtopresume awhole, areferential context which, however,wecannot secure cognitively. This condition of the possibilityo fk nowledge must itself remain within the area of non-knowledge. "Knowing" things( in the world) is one thing; "revealing" (in German "offenbaren")t he world in which these thingsh avet heir place (their significance) is quite another (Cavell 1979a: 54) .
2F ilm and Acknowledgement
ForCavell, scepticism and its counterpart,acknowledgement,i llustrate the central problem not onlyofphilosophy, but also of art, especiallyofthe art form of tragedy. The tragic dimension of the sceptic as person, which consists in continuallyd enying the existenceo ft he other,t he so-called problem of other minds, indeedo fe xistencea ta ll, and in so doing finding himself, the others and the objective world in isolation and meaninglessness,emergeswith existential vehemence in the tragedies, for Cavell predominantlyt hoseo fS hakespeare ( Sparti/ Hammer 2002:23) .
As for film, Cavell offers the far-reaching hypothesis that it is "am oving imageo fs cepticism" (Cavell 1979b: 188) . This means, first of all, that the world which is perceivable on the screen is inaccessible (in al iteral sense) for us as viewers,j ust as for the figures in the screen world, i. e. our world is vice versa inaccessible ( Cavell 1979b:24, 155) . Onlyamovie is able to playw ith that situation. Then all persons involved are moving between their ontological dimensions, likei nW oodyA llen's TheP urple Rose of Cairo (1985) , or in Last Action Hero (1993, with Arnold Schwarzenegger).F ilm presents us as viewers with a world to which we mayhaveaccess in our imagination, and yetnot ontologically, at least not at the moment at which we perceive it.A sa gents we are excluded from it.I ti saworld, i. e. an action context,i nw hich we cannot be physically present and act in. And this description leads to the well-known sceptical reaction that the world projected onto the screen (thus) does not exist.
But film is amoving picture not onlyofscepticism, but also of acknowledgement.C orrespondingt ot he two focal pointsi nC avell'sa rgumentation for the primacy of acknowledgement,f ilm provides two possible ways of awardingevidence to this primacy.The first one, the acknowledgement of the other, is most at home in the Hollywood comedies of remarriage.Whilstinmelodramas the external presentation of happiness in marriagei sm ale-dominated, onlyp ermitting the wife to find her own voice and express her individuality in the painful processes of self-discovery,t he comedies of remarriage (made prominent by actors like Spencer Tracy,K atharine Hepburn and CaryGrant)show how an individual can onlyb uild up ar elationship to himself with the help of other individuals, through friendship and love. Here, indeed, we can hear Hegel'sc oncept of ac-knowledgement in the background. All the verbal battles between the still married and not yetr emarried couples are aimeda tareadjustment of balance between the self and other. In the melodrama the (married)m an fights against the idea of his wife being acknowledged(by himself and by others);inthe comedyofremarriage,the battle of the sexes ragesturbulentlyyet with ultimatebite inhibition, ap urelyv erbalb attle for mutual acknowledgement (Cavell 1996 :9 , 30,S parti/Hammer 2002 :2 9, Rothman 2009 .
Film also, however,p rovides as olution to the second central aspect of Cavell'sc oncept of acknowledgement,n amelyt he relationship to the world as aw hole. Building on Kant'sd escription of the problem, and addressingt hose problems broughtf orth by Wittgenstein (and Heidegger),C avell'ss olution is that we as recognizing beingsa re forced to anticipate aw hole (world),b ut that we are not capable of grasping it cognitively. This accepted coercion, or this insight into anecessity,isthe correct consequencetodrawfrom Kant'stheory of finiteness. Film, based on the technique of photography, drawst his consequence in its ownway. "The camera, beingfinite, crops aportion from an indefinitelyl argerf ield; continuous portions of that field could be included in the photograph in fact taken; in principle it could all be taken.
[…]W hen ap hotograph is cropped, the restofthe world is cut out" (Cavell 1979b: 24) . Aphotograph is "of aworld," where "world" is aterm of totality for an infinite referential context.The recordingcamera always cuts something out of the world, always presenting acutting of the world. That is its standpoint of finiteness.But,turned on its head, this means thate very cutting implies the whole, that every visual presentation implies what it is not presenting. In the case of the photographic picture, as opposed to apaintedp icture, the infinite is an implication of the finite.
On the other hand, two obvious objections can be raised for ac ritique of Cavell'sf ilm philosophyp ursuant to his two focalp oints: acknowledgement of the other and acknowledgement of the world as awhole. Firstly, solving aproblem which arises through the medium of film by employing as ub-genre of film must be unsatisfactory.A samedium, film places the viewer in as tate of isolation, expressed in ac ultural-historical way: in the state of Cartesian, Protestant and tragic subjectivity which existentiallydescribes scepticism. Agenre such as the comedies of remarriagecan, at best,balance out this formal deficiency of the medium, but not solve it.Secondly, it is obviousthat the world as awhole is an implication not onlyo ff ilm, but also of photography. The film'sa chievement concerning these two points-its implication of the world and acknowledgement of subjectivity-would thereforeh avet ob ep resented in ad ifferent way. Is hall touch upon that wayi nm yf urther comments below.
3S ubjectivity,M odernity,a nd Movement
In which way, then, firstly, can film as am edium achieve acknowledgement of subjectivity?I no rder to answer this question in terms of Cavell, it seems fitting to extend his understanding of the conceptso fs ubjectivity and acknowledgement by includinganew dimension crystallised in German idealism. Both concepts-subjectivity and acknowledgement-are considerably less markedbyDescartes than by Kant and So what about subjectivity?A ccordingt oK ant and his Idealist successors, it is ar elationalc oncept.I ti st he term describing an entity whose relationship to other is accompanied by ap ermanent relationship to self. What we call "I" is, within the so-called mentalist,o rs ubject-object paradigm, nothing other thana(double) relationship. Anyone saying "I" has always already, thus in the mode of an apriori perfect tense, doubled himself. He or she has produced an equation with "I" on both sides. An "I" can onlyexist as this relationship. It is not athing,not an object.I tisnothing other thanthe relationship itself, infinite self-reference.
This bringsm et oacomparison-as peculative analogy-between subjectivity and film, in which the tertium comparationis is movement. As infiniteself-referencethe Self is ad ynamic relation, so to speak akind of pure movement,ora kind of mental perpetuum mobile. And however one wishestodefine film and the type of movement which might be characterized within it,itwill not be possible without the category of movement as such. SiegfriedK racauer (for him movement,f or example chases, are quasi made for the screen), Gilles Deleuze (the moving-image and the higher estimated time-image), NoëlC arroll (film belongs to the class of moving images)a nd others offer well-known examples for such at hesis (Kracauer 1985 : 71-72, Deleuze 1986 ,C arroll1 996:4 9, Currie 1995 . "Movement" here has three meanings:t he mechanical meaning due to the cameraa nd the projection machine; the meaning of objectivei llusion created by the acceleration of sequencesofimages; and aboveall consciouslyconstructed sequences of images via montage(which givesusthe impression of adynamics of space without moving our own body).
Within this framework of at heory of self-consciousness, named especially by Hegel, acknowledgementi st he resulto fa na ltercation, a "movement" back and forth, in which each subjectattempts to grasp the other.But since grasping the other is an act of objectification, it includes seeing the other as an object and insofar destroyingt he other in its self-reliance. Thusi nt he "movement" of ac-knowledgement each subject attempts in externallydirected action to do what it has to do for internal reasons:toobjectify itself. Asubjectcan achieveconsciousness of itself onlyb yo bjectifying itself; this internal dynamics has an external equivalent in the objectification of another subjectbecause in the process of acknowledgement,a sw ell, it is an ecessary step to see this subject as an object. Self-consciousness is aresultofaprocess of objectification. The culturaland artistic medium which can, better than anyother,present this complicated movement or process of self-objectification is film, feature film, as literature and theatre but alsod ance are weaker competitors. It exhibitsastory of people who interact with each other and their environment trying to objectivise themselves on al evel of reciprocal recognition. At the same time this external relationship between (inter)actingsubjectivities represents the internal relationship of subjectivity trying to objectivise itself. In both cases we have to deal with an infinite relationship. Whatwecall subjectivity or self-consciousness is nothing but movement.
Of course, Iama ware that these propositions are in need of further and detailed argumentation. Ihavedone thatinm yrecent books (Früchtl 2009 ,Früchtl 2013 . What Ican present here, is onlythe outline of that argumentation. But my first proposition is clear: film is the adequate mediumo fs ubjectivity.I ni tt he subjectf inds the symbolic-aesthetic acknowledgement best suited to its formal philosophical structure worked out by German idealism. And-extendingm y proposition-as long as subjectivity,a gain in line with Hegel, also functions as aprinciple of Modernity (see Habermas 1990) , it becomes clear that the presented essentialisticd etermination of film in fact is am odern one, or put another way, that it requires relativisation in historic terms.
Forn ow,two questions mayr emain. The first one is whether the concept of acknowledgement as we know it from German idealismm ay be assigned to the relationship between spectator( subject) and movie( object). In my reading, Cavell is workingw ith two concepts of acknowledgement: an ontological-existentialist and as ocial.The first one standsi nt he tradition from Kierkegaard to Heideggera nd Sartre, the second one from Fichtea nd Hegel to Honneth. In Cavell'sHollywood comedies of remarriagethe figures act in the sense of asocial and reciprocal acknowledgement,t hough Cavell doesn'tr efere xplicitlyt ot he German idealistt radition, onlyi ndirectly, we mays ay,via romanticism and the Americantranscendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau.But if it is about the relationship between spectator and the worldo ns creen, we cannot strictlyw ork with the social concept of acknowledgement.I nt hat case, acknowledgement means that the contemplating or perceiving subject feels provoked to show areaction which in fact is anon-epistemic confirmation: not of what is going on on screen, but that there is something going on. The fact that asubjectisreactingto something is alreadyafirst and basica ct of acknowledging it.
Beyond that,ifweconceive of the cineasticallyperceiving and experiencing subjectinthe sense of the German idealist theory of the Self, that Self has to follow the infinite dynamics, so to speak the internal movement,that is hidden in the act of self-identification, which in fact is an equation: saying "I" implies "I=I".Based on thatdynamic structure, the Self recognizes itself in the structure of mobilization of af ilm. The Self reacts to af ilm before-in as ystematic, not a temporalway-reactingtoits content.The infiniteinner dynamics of subjectivity mirrors itself in the dynamics of the mediumo ff ilm. And if Hegel is right in claiming for the first time that subjectivity is the principle of Modernity as well, then film is the most adequate aesthetic medium of that epoch.
But why-one might ask anew-isn'tt his true for music, too?M usic, too, is an arto f" movement",o fd ynamics of tones and acoustic-compositional forms. My answer,a gain very quickly,would be that film relies on the structure of spacea nd time, not-like music does-onlyo ft ime. As Erwin Panofsky has alreadys tated, film offers a "dynamisation of space" and ar espective "spatialisation of time".D ifferent to what is happeningonatheatre stage, it is not only bodies that are moving in space but space itself: it is approaching,drawing back, turning around, dissolving and taking shape again (Panofsky1 999:25, see also Seel 2005:182-185) . In the caseoffilm, seeing means perceiving and experiencing ap ermanentlyc hanging, temporallys tructured space. Film offers am obile and pictorial experience of space, the experience of av irtual mobile space. And to this epistemological and ontological structure, film finally adds the performance we know from literature and theatre: acting and verbalising figures that in principal refert oe ach other in the wayo fm utualr ecognition. Thisi sa uniquea chievement of film that illustrates,s een against the background of Cavell, its twofold mannero fa cknowledgement.
The second question that remains is whether film as an aesthetic-technological medium does not harkenb ackt oac onception of the Self which, following the linguistic turn,either no longer stands up at all or onlyinamodified form. As is well known, German Idealism pursued Descartes' mental representation model, according to which the word "I" stands for ar epresentation (repraesentatio), albeit av ery special one, one which represents nothing (sensual), one to which we cannot refer directly, but onlyr egressively-analytically. From this, 20 th century linguistic philosophyi nfers ap rocession from the substantivistic self to the personal pronoun "I",a nalysingt he use of this expression and concluding that this expression is "not ac oncept,n ot ap roper noun, not al abel for something (includingarepresentation), but asingular term with an exclusively index-ical function".The meaningofthe word "I" is to be found not in the fact "thatit denotes,b ut that it indicates" (Schnädelbach 2012: 98) .
This question can be answered in two ways.O nt he one hand,i ns ubjectphilosophical terms,t he critique based on languagep hilosophyd oes have to be taken seriously, and yeti ti sp atentlyn ot capable of completelyr eplacing the programme of consciousness philosophy. Thew orks of Manfred Frank stand for ac ritique of the critique (see Frank 1991 , Frank 2012 . On the other hand, in film-philosophical terms, it should be emphasised thatt he limits of the mentalistic-idealistic conception of the self can also, and especially, be demonstratedu sing film, bringing its indexical character to the fore. Film does not primarily show something by pointing towards it in the manner of as ign, but by creating a presence,asense which cannot be fullyexpressed in propositions.
The showing itself does not fullym erge into its apparent message, preciselyb ecause of its underlying movement.T ot his extent,i nasense, film showst hat which is gestic. In the words of Kant-to whom Iwillrefer to in the following section-,itindicates something,namely that those who refer to themselvesbysaying "I" can also refer to the world as something which is "fitting" for them.
4A esthetic Experience, the World as aW hole, andT rust
So farIhave argued for the first aspect of acknowledgement-the acknowledgement of subjectivity-within the framework of cinema.Secondly, the philosophy of Kant and GermanIdealism alsoseem to be helpful concerning clarification of the cineastic acknowledgement of the world as aw hole, albeit with one major difference. Whereas acknowledgement of the subjectivity specific to Modernity is best achieved by the medium of film, an equal privilegec annot be claimed for film regarding acknowledgement of the world as aw hole, or at least not while it is still dependent upon the technique of photographyo ri sb ased on the trusted realism of everydayp racticality.T hisi se vent rue of an animationstrongg enre such as "mind-game movies",f ilms which playi nt he heads of the main characters and therefore at the sametime playagame with the viewer, frequentlyb ound up in epistemological and ontological confusions (Elsaesser 2009 ). In Inception (2010,b yC hristopher Nolan), af ilm about ad ream within ad ream within ad ream, the cityscape of Paris collapses in on itself like an eggb ox;awonderful, completelyo riginal image; but in order to have such an effect,o ur everydayr ealism-so to say, our photographic realism-is required.
The imagery of film relies to an unavoidable extent on recordings of our everyday world. In order to acknowledge the world as awhole cineastically, it is necessary to take two largera rgumentative steps.F irstly, one has to deviate to the more general level of aesthetic experience,a nd for this Kant remains the best starting block. The games of Verstand and Einbildungskraft,o fo ur linguistic-logical and imaginative capacity,which constitutes aestheticj udging permits no cognitive or otherwise definitive judgements. But in the case of aestheticj udgments the strangea greement (Übereinstimmung or Zusammenstimmung)b etween the cognitive capacities which are actuallyd irected against each other-since our understanding wants to have rules and laws whereas imagination wants to be productive without anylaw-permits us to conclude the agreement of subjectivity and objectivity,o fo ur self and of the world. In his earlyw orks (Kant Refl.Log.: 1820a) , Kant coined af ormulation for this which sounds just as old-fashioned and classicallyancient as it does timeless and gentle: "Beautiful thingsindicate that human beingsm atch (fit in) the world" (Die schönen Dinge zeigen an, dass der Mensch in die Welt passe). The question of how one feels as ar easonable being would have to be answered in Kantian terms indeed as follows: "One feels at home in oneself and in the world" (Recki 2006:102) . But it has to be repeated that this is as trangef eeling,a ss trangea st he agreement between the cognitive faculties, and thati ti sp rimarilya ne pistemological-ontological feeling,n ot an ethical or political one. Theo ntological affirmation provided by an aesthetic experience has no implication of political conservatism. The aesthetic feeling of fitting in the world (as such) is prior to apolitical or ethical judgement, and thus means more than aW ittgensteinian fitting in away of life (seeScruton 2011). Aesthetic experiences indicate, in an ontologicalorexistential sense, that the basic relationship between man and the world can be viewed as amatching and am atch.
This matchingcan now be further explained in asecond step, using the concept of trust. Philosophicallyspeaking, this term has been apart of Political Philosophys ince Hobbes and has become af amiliar term in Moral Philosophy through ac riticism of Kant put forward by AnnetteB aier and Carol Gilligan. In Sociology, the term has acted as af unctional compensation for knowledge since GeorgS immel. Under the conditions of extensive anonymity,c oordinated action is not possible in anyo ther way ( Hartmann 2001:10-12; Giddens 1990: 29,8 8, 92; O ' Neill 2002:6 ) . Form yt heme,apsychological meaning of the trust concept is particularlyr elevant,n amelyw hat Erik Erikson called "basic trust" (in German "Urvertrauen"). The sense of the reality of thingsa nd human beingsi sh ere the product of ar elationship of trust that means of as table, positive interaction. Al ack of reality,i nr everse, indicates al ack of trust.
And this is preciselyCavell'stheory with regard to sceptics.They denyreality because they lack trust,and they lack it because they cannot build upon the stability,h owever unstable, of positive interactional relationships.T oq uote Hilary Putnam, they cannot build upon the "shockinglys imple" insight from Wittgenstein's On Certainty that "al anguageg ame is onlyp ossiblei fo ne trusts something" or "relies on something" ("… dass ein Sprachspiel nur möglich ist, wenn man sich aufe twas verlässt.( Ich habe nicht gesagt 'aufe twas verlassen kann')") ( Putnam 1995:1 77) . Sceptics cannot,a sM artin Hartmann puts it,r ely on a "practice of trust",which, because it cannot be defined as ap ractice and yetprovides the context for rules and criteria, presupposes a "trust in practice"; at rust in the existenceo fapractice of trust.A ccordingt oH artmann, the vehemence of this vicious circle can be removed by giving the trust "amoderately existential character",that means to the extent that one namesi tw ith recourse to what psychologycalls "basic trust" (in German Urvertrauen)and phenomenology calls "trust in the world" (Weltvertrauen). Normally, as is well known, we rely on the fact that ab uilding will not collapse, that the sun will rise and that our fellow men will not approach us with (very) evil actions. Hartmann initiallyr ejects this manner of speakingbecause it fails to fulfil abasic condition of action, namelythe featuring of options. Where we cannot act anydifferentlybecause we have no alternative,wecannot trust.Tothis extent it does not reallymake sense to sayt hat one trusts in the fact that the buildingo ne is enteringw ill not collapse. But for Hartmann, as at rust in practice,b asict rust or trust in the world is justified. We can do nothing othert han to trust thatt hosei nw hom we place our trust are actuallyp ursuing our practical understanding of trust (see Hartmann2 011:31, 71, 107, 114, 119, 3 11) .
To the extent,t hen, that an aesthetic experience-that means, still closely following Kant: the interaction (Zusammenspiel)o fo ur epistemic dimensions of experience, i. e. of sensuousness, imagination and reason-in other words: the interaction of affections-perceptions, imaginings and interpretations-permits us to conclude an interaction between the subject of the said experience and the world, such an aesthetic experience achieves an acknowledgement of the worldasawhole. As an aesthetic practice, it reinforcesthat existential or ontological affirmation which we exercise in our various lifeworld, in particularontogenetic-intersubjective practices.T his is, however,a sIhave said already, an achievement of the aesthetic, and not solelyt he cineastic experience.Cineastic experiencesr estore our trust in the modern world; aesthetice xperiences restore our trust in the world (as such).
